Young Men and Fire

Our summary

Young Men and Fire is a classic of American literature. Norman Maclean (1902–1990) was a professor of English literature at the University of Chicago. He also wrote fiction, notably a short novel, A River Runs Through It, which also became a classic (adapted into a film by Robert Redford). Maclean's interest in this deadly fire stemmed from his youth when he was himself a firefighter in Montana, where he lived at the time. The fire he recounts was an extraordinary event that left a lasting impression on both U.S. and international foresters and firefighters.

But why would Foncsi's partners be interested in a forest fire, however exceptional? It’s because the story of Mann Gulch has far surpassed the audience of foresters and firefighters to become a classic in scientific literature on accidents in general. Maclean’s book is of such high quality in terms of information and analysis that it has been used as a source and example for hundreds of studies on resilience, leadership, sensemaking, and, more broadly, on analyses of organizational and human factors. The most famous of these studies is undoubtedly the article by Karl E. Weick (1993), which has been cited more than five thousand times in scientific literature.

The Mann Gulch fire has thus become an “exemplary example”, one of those cases to which an entire community, here that of safety, constantly refers. It fuels research, theories, comparisons, controversies, and, of course, lessons.
 

The Story

On August 5, 1949, a forest fire was spotted in a wilderness area of Montana, on the southern slope of a ravine called Mann Gulch. Fifteen firefighters were parachuted in mid-afternoon on the opposite side of the ravine. They were part of a specialized brigade, the Smokejumpers, considered the elite among foresters. In rugged areas without access roads, parachuting firefighters allows for intervention at the very beginning of a fire. The Smokejumpers were equipped with basic tools: axes, shovels, and saws. The usual technique for controlling a fire was to isolate it by clearing a strip of soil fifty centimeters to a meter wide. Generally, the firefighters worked all night and were retrieved the next morning by teams arriving in vehicles.

The Smokejumpers were mostly young foresters and students who saw this as an opportunity for physical and human adventures. The team that jumped into Mann Gulch was led by an experienced and respected team leader, Wag Dodge, who was famous for his brevity. Due to the rotation system governing team composition, Dodge barely knew the men he was commanding that day. The Mann Gulch fire didn’t seem particularly difficult, though the terrain was especially rugged.

However, Dodge, alerted by signs he did not share with his team, decided not to attack the fire directly. He ordered the team to descend the ravine on the side opposite the fire to attack it from an angle he considered safer, while also moving his team closer to the river (the Missouri), which could serve as a refuge if necessary. The team followed him obediently until he suddenly turned around and ordered them to head back. Dodge himself began quickly climbing the ravine despite the steep slope.

What Dodge had seen was that the fire had crossed the ravine and was advancing toward the firefighters. On this side, the vegetation consisted of scattered trees and tall grass, causing the fire to intensify dramatically and spread quickly, faster than the men could run. The firefighters' hope was to reach the crest of the ravine and take shelter on the rocky, vegetation-free areas.

Only two firefighters reached the top. Dodge laid down in a fire he had set himself and let the wall of flames pass over him. He emerged unscathed. Despite his attempts to signal his men to join him, the thirteen victims chose to continue running toward the crest and were overtaken by the fire.
 

Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) in this Work

The richness of the Mann Gulch case paradoxically lies in the modesty of its components, making it easy to grasp the essentials. The Smokejumpers team is a basic organization, but it contains hierarchy, a distribution of skills, and leadership, communication, and decision-making processes. It also includes the fundamental element of organizational functioning: routines, or habitual modes of action, supported by technology, albeit rudimentary in this case. In short, we find all the organizational and human factors that come into play in high-risk organizations. All these elements are brutally challenged by an unexpected event. They do not hold up: routines fail, communication breaks down, leadership is ineffective, hierarchy is powerless, and the skills benefit only one person (Dodge), when they could have saved everyone.

In his analysis, Karl Weick adds to this organizational breakdown a “collapse of sensemaking”, an inability of the team to make sense of the situation and act accordingly. This is one of the analyses that feeds into his theory of sensemaking.

But the story of Young Men and Fire is also a confrontation between humans and an element that cannot be fully controlled. Here, it’s a natural element (or rather, a combination of natural elements, as the analysis shows that the wind, the river, the vegetation, etc., all played their part). And in the face of ecological and climate issues, it’s important to remember that nature continues to surprise us. In many other cases, it’s technologies that escape control. There is, in fact, no fundamental difference: in what Weick calls a “cosmology episode”, whether it’s nature, technology, or a combination of both, the organization is suddenly confronted with its limitations.

Naturally, the issue of interest to safety is how to avoid such surprises, to uncover these limits, and to address them before they lead to harmful consequences. The Mann Gulch tragedy deeply changed the operating procedures for fighting forest fires. Karl Weick drew from it the principles of resilience, which he later developed for businesses in his book with Kathleen Sutcliffe (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2011). The issue of leadership also found avenues for development, and the Mann Gulch site has become the destination for learning expeditions for leaders (O’Grady et al. 2021).

But perhaps the main lesson of Young Men and Fire is an invitation to modesty, or more precisely, to cultivate and maintain modesty. Our knowledge and our ways of acting are limited, always limited, even in areas that seem familiar to us. We believe they are familiar because, according to our understanding, on the scale of our activity, and with regard to our means, they seem manageable. It is natural, tempting, and perhaps inevitable to indulge in the comfort of this belief. But, as Downer (2011) reminds us, we can unknowingly cross the limits of our knowledge. This is not about mad scientists or leaders overtaken by hubris. These are ordinary organizations composed of ordinary people who, like the Smokejumpers at Mann Gulch, may one day find themselves facing a “monster”. The “wisdom as an attitude” advocated by Karl Weick consists of keeping this in mind, constantly reminding ourselves of it, especially when it seems irrelevant, or even laughable. Maintaining modesty is the work that sustains this wisdom. It is, first and foremost, the mission of safety professionals.

There are therefore several reasons to read Young Men and Fire. First, it is a rich source of lessons for anyone interested in accidents and their prevention. Second, it provides a common ground for the entire organizational safety community, where discussions can constantly evolve and deepen. Third, it is a splendidly told story—a narrative of the confrontation between humans and the natural world, as gripping as the most thrilling series.